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• Quality improvement, including financial 
incentives 
• Integrated care 
• Competition in healthcare 
• Giving more responsibility to primary care 
Financial incentives to improve 
quality of care (QOF)  
• UK Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) 
 
• Introduced 2004 
 
• Complex set of clinical, organisational and 
patient experience indicators which account for 
~25% of GPs’ income 
Financial incentives 2011/12 (Clinical indicators) 
 
Coronary heart disease – secondary prevention  
Cardiovascular disease – primary prevention  
Heart failure  
Stroke and Transient Ischaemic Attack  
Hypertension  
Diabetes mellitus  
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease  
Epilepsy  
Hypothyroid  
Cancer  
Palliative care  
Mental health  
Asthma 
Dementia  
Depression  
Chronic kidney disease  
Atrial fibrillation  
Obesity  
Learning disabilities  
Smoking 
 
www.bma.org.uk/images/qofguidancefourthversion2011_v2_tcm41-205262.pdf 
CHD 7. The percentage of patients with coronary 
heart disease whose notes have a record of total 
cholesterol in the previous 15 months.    
 
Point score: from 1 point (25%) to 7 points (90%) 
 
CHD 8. The percentage of patients with coronary 
heart disease whose last total cholesterol 
(measured in the last 15 months) is 5mmol/l or less  
 
Point score: from 1 point (25%) to 16 points (60%) 
   Exception reporting for clinical indicators 
 
 
• Patient refused 
 
• Not clinically appropriate 
 
• Newly diagnosed or recently registered  
 
• Already on maximum doses of medication  
 
 
Organisational indicators 
 
Records  
 
Information to patients  
 
Education and training  
 
Practice management  
 
Medicines management  
 
Patient experience 
 
Quality and Productivity 
 
 
www.bma.org.uk/images/qofguidancefourthversion2011_v2_tcm41-
205262.pdf 
 
 Additional services 
• Cervical cytology 
• Child health surveillance 
• Maternity services 
• Contraception 
   www.bma.org.uk/images/qofguidancefourthversion20_11_v2_tcm41-
205262.pdf 
 
 Patient experience  
• Developing Patient Reference Group (PRG) 
• Carrying out patient surveys 
• Discussing results with PRG 
• Agreeing ‘Action Plan’ with PRG 
 
www.nhsemployers.org/PayAndContracts/GeneralMedicalServicesContr
act/DirectedEnhancedServices/Pages/DESs-2011-12.aspx 
 
Financial incentives to improve 
quality of care (QOF)  
• Quality of care for several major chronic diseases 
was already improving rapidly before QOF 
 
• QOF resulted in some increase in the rate of 
quality improvement 
 
• There were some unintended consequences 
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Patients with 
CHD 
 
1998 
 
2007 
 
% with blood 
pressure            
≤ 150/90 
 
48% 
 
83% 
% with total 
cholesterol        
≤ 5mmol/l 
 
17% 
 
80% 
Quality improvements have been substantial 
Campbell S et al. NEJM 2009; 361: 368-78.  
No magic bullet 
 
National guidelines 
Clinical governance 
Audit and feedback 
Public reporting 
Annual appraisal 
Opinion leaders 
Financial incentives 
• Financial incentives may help (with other 
things) to improve quality of care. 
 
• Are there any unintended consequences? 
Example of an unintended outcome 
 
Indicator: Patients should be able to 
make an appointment to see a doctor 
within 48 hours 
 
Response: Advanced Access – offer 
unlimited appointments ‘on the day’ 
 
Consequence: Patients are unable to 
book ahead, and can only book on the 
day 
 
Financial incentives to improve 
quality of care - summary 
• Financial incentives are fully justified to cover the 
additional costs of providing good care: doctors 
should not be out of pocket for providing good care 
• Not a magic bullet 
• So far as possible, financial incentives should be 
aligned with professional incentives 
• All incentives can have unexpected consequences 
• Reputational incentives may be as important as 
financial incentives  
          
   Exception reporting for clinical indicators 
 
 
• Patient refused 
 
• Not clinically appropriate 
 
• Newly diagnosed or recently registered  
 
• Already on maximum doses of medication  
 
 
Roland M. NEJM 2004; 351: 1448-54.  

• Quality improvement, including financial 
incentives 
• Integrated care 
• Competition in healthcare 
• Giving more responsibility to primary care 
Evaluation of English ‘Integrated Care 
Pilots’ 
• 16 sites which aimed to provide more 
integrated care 
• 6 sites focused specifically on case 
management of frail elderly people 
i) Staff surveys 
 
• working more closely with team members 
• better communication in their organisation 
• better communication with other organisations 
• more interesting jobs (staff closely involved) 
• care for patients improved 
  
 
 
Evaluation of six case management initiatives (1) 
•  More likely to have received a care plan 
 
• Clear follow up arrangements after leaving hospital 
 
• More likely to know who to contact with questions 
about treatment following hospital discharge 
 
Evaluation of six case management initiatives (2) 
ii) Patient surveys 
 
• Less likely to see the GP they prefer 
 
• Less likely to see the nurse they prefer 
 
• GPs less likely to involve them in decisions about care 
 
• Nurses less likely to involve them in decisions about care 
 
• GPs less good at listening 
 
• Opinions less likely to be taken into account                     
by social services  
…… but 
 
• Emergency hospital admission increased 
 
• Outpatient attendance reduced 
 
• Elective admission reduced 
 
• Small significant reduction in net secondary 
care costs 
 
…… and 
Systematic review on the effectiveness of 
interventions to improve coordination 
 
• 55% of interventions improved care 
• 45% of interventions improved patient 
experience 
• 18% of interventions reduced cost 
 
      http://aphcri.anu.edu.au/research-program/aphcri-network-
research-completed/stream-four-translating-evidence-
policy/coordination-care-within  
 
Integrated care: barriers and facilitators to 
quality improvement 
• Leadership 
• Engaging doctors 
• Good information systems 
• Not being too ambitious 
• Resourcing 
• Expecting that change will take longer 
than you originally thought 
• Quality improvement, including financial 
incentives 
• Integrated care 
• Competition in healthcare 
• Giving more responsibility to primary care 
 
 “Using AMI mortality as a quality indicator, we find that mortality  fell more quickly (i.e. quality improved) for 
patients living in more competitive markets  after the 
introduction of hospital competition in January 2006.  
Our results suggest that  hospital competition in 
markets with fixed prices can lead to improvements in 
clinical quality.” 
 



• Can you combine a competitive 
market in health care with the 
integrated care that your increasingly 
elderly population needs?  
 
• Quality improvement, including financial 
incentives 
• Integrated care 
• Competition in healthcare 
• Giving more responsibility to primary care 
History 
• 1990 – purchaser provider split – hospital care is purchased 
(or commissioned) by a payer 
 
• 1990-1998 – experimented with GP fundholding – abolished 
by Labour 
 
• 2004 – GP involvement in budget allocation re-established 
as ‘practice based commissioning’ 
 
• 2013 - Primary Care Trusts to be abolished 
  - Consortia led by GPs to be given 70% of entire  
hospital budget to commission services from 
hospitals 
 
                  
Salary   Pay independent of workload or  
   quality 
 
Capitation  Pay according to the number of  
   people on a doctor’s list 
 
Fee for service Pay for individual items of care 
 
 
Quality   Pay for meeting quality targets 
How should doctors be paid? 
 
                  
Salary   Pay independent of workload or  
   quality 
 
Capitation  Pay according to the number of  
   people on a doctor’s list 
 
Fee for service Pay for individual items of care 
 
 
Quality   Pay for meeting quality targets 
What would you get without professionalism? 
 
 
Salary   Do as little as possible for as few  
   people as possible  
 
Capitation  Do as little as possible for as many  
   people as possible 
 
Fee for service Do as much as possible,  whether or  
   not it helps the patient 
 
Quality   Carry out a limited range of highly  
   commendable tasks, but do nothing  
   else 
 
What would you get without professionalism? 
 
So what have we learned? 
1. Primary care is still seen as the key to high quality cost 
effective healthcare. A population base is critical. 
2. Measures to improve quality have been effective, but don’t 
expect quick solutions – interventions need to be multiple and 
sustained. Financial incentives have a role. 
3. You get what you pay for in healthcare. Especially when it 
comes to paying doctors. Many countries in the world regard a 
system based on fee for service as unsustainable in the long 
term as it usually results in over-provision. 
4. All incentives have unexpected consequences. Try and make 
sure that financial and professional incentives are closely 
aligned.  
5. Clinical engagement is critical to the success of most major 
healthcare developments. We have relied to much on 
management and are regretting it. 
6. Change comes slowly. Make sure that your changes integrate 
rather than fragment care. Major changes take several years to 
bed in. Expect that things won’t go smoothly, and allow enough 
time before assessing whether you have been successful.  
